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Proliferation of Terminology and the
Illusion of Progress
Payam Akhavan
Faculty of Law, McGill University; formerly Legal Advisor to the
Office of the Prosecutor, ICTY–ICTR, The Hague

As scholars and advocates, we are formidable taxonomists and explorers of
distinctions, ever probing new conceptual frontiers in the elusive quest to render an
overwhelming universe of human struggle more coherent and manageable.
The proliferation of terminology, however, the incantation of new strategic mantras,
while obviously relevant to the legal and political construction of the world, can often
become a self-contained exercise creating the mere illusion of progress. In some
circumstances, it can even divert precious resources away from the consolidation of
existing, and hard-won, norms and institutions. In considering the introduction of the
term ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ to the already complex lexicon of humanitarian discourse,
we need to take account of its relative weight in terms of the most important
challenges confronting the prevention of genocide. In particular, we need to ask
whether the cost–benefit calculus of promoting this new concept and purported
discipline justifies a significant commitment of energy and resources, whether
intellectual or political, that might otherwise be focused on strengthening established
concepts and disciplines that may be adequate but still at the margins of political
consciousness. While I have the utmost respect and admiration for David Scheffer’s
unique contributions to the prevention and punishment of genocide and crimes against
humanity, I have misgivings about the relative weight and importance that he assigns
to ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ as a useful instrument for promoting this cause.
The argument that the loaded term ‘‘genocide’’ intimidates states from responding
effectively must be assessed against the fact that alternative categorizations have only
marginal impact on meaningful action where there is a failure of political will. Are we
to conclude, for instance, that US willingness to characterize the Darfur situation as
‘‘genocide’’ resulted in a more robust response compared to Rwanda, where there was
reluctance to use this term? Or, conversely, that if the term ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ had been
used in an early-warning context, there would have been greater preventive
engagement on the part of the United Nations prior to escalation into genocidal
violence? Furthermore, the newly established mandate of the UN special adviser on
the prevention of genocide clearly indicates that a prior legal determination that acts
constitute genocide or crimes of comparable gravity is not required for preventive
action. With the gradual mainstreaming of this mandate in the UN system, it is
increasingly understood that there is a distinction between ‘‘genocide’’ and ‘‘prevention
of genocide.’’ In any event, to the extent that conceptual categorization has an
appreciable impact in a preventive context, there is evidence that the elevated status
of genocide or crimes of comparable gravity has justified prioritization of certain
situations amidst the multitude of issues clamoring for global attention. A safer,
more diluted concept such as ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ may actually undermine such
privileged treatment. Even assuming that a less intimidating concept is required,
Payam Akhavan, ‘‘Proliferation of Terminology and the Illusion of Progress.’’ Genocide Studies
and Prevention 2, 1 (April 2007): 73–80. ß 2007 Genocide Studies and Prevention.

Genocide Studies and Prevention 2:1 April 2007

there is no compelling reason not to use well-established and easily recognized terms
such as ‘‘gross’’ or ‘‘large-scale’’ human-rights violations, which are standards applied
in different contexts for prioritizing international scrutiny of certain situations by
UN bodies. If anything, restricting ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ to the elementary category of war
crimes while not including the broader category of human-rights violations falsely
and dangerously assumes that abuses in situations not amounting to a state of war
or armed conflict do not have the potential to culminate in genocide. It is also doubtful
that a new concept of ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ would somehow focus the attention of the wider
public and thereby mobilize opinion and encourage action. It is safe to assume that
public calls for action are primarily the result of shocking contextualized images
of suffering conveyed by the media, or the intimate accounts of survivors, and not
of abstract legal categorization of situations. The bottom line is that what we need
most is not a conceptual or rhetorical magic bullet but, rather, a greater focus on
integrating and mainstreaming existing concepts and institutions into the daily habits
and rituals of decision-makers, with a view to transforming an entrenched culture
of reaction into a culture of prevention.
In certain respects, the preoccupation with preventive terminology emerged most
forcefully in the crucible of Rwanda. It is well-known in genocide-studies circles that in
1994, during the extermination campaign against Tutsis, officials in the Clinton
administration were instructed ‘‘not to describe the deaths as genocide, even though
some senior officials believe that is exactly what they represent.’’1 There are some
suggestions that this reluctance was based on the view that characterizing the killings
as ‘‘genocide’’ would trigger application of the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG) and the corresponding obligation
under art. 1, whereby states parties ‘‘undertake to prevent and to punish’’ the crime
of genocide.2 To the extent that denial of the term ‘‘genocide’’ was actuated by such
a view, it is based on a false premise. In the Application of the Genocide Convention
Case, the eminent judge ad hoc appointed by Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sir Elihu
Lauterpacht, considered whether the duty to prevent under art. 1 ‘‘extends beyond
the duty of each party to prevent genocide within its own territory to that of preventing
genocide wherever it may occur.’’3 He surveyed contemporary incidents of genocide
and concluded that ‘‘the limited reaction of the parties to the Genocide Convention
in relation to these episodes may represent a practice suggesting the permissibility
of inactivity.’’4 It is more significant that US officials were willing to admit that ‘‘acts
of genocide may have occurred,’’ because a label as stark as ‘‘genocide’’ would ‘‘inflame
public calls for action the Administration is unwilling to take.’’5 In other words, it was
the mere rhetorical force of genocide, its perception as the pinnacle of evil, that
rendered its use controversial, rather than any particular legal consequences flowing
therefrom. US Secretary of State Warren Christopher deflated the rhetorical
onslaught of human-rights advocates by remarking dismissively that ‘‘if there’s any
particular magic in calling it a genocide, I have no hesitancy in saying that.’’6 During
his visit to Kigali on 25 March 1998, a somewhat contrite President Bill Clinton said
that the international community ‘‘bear[s] its share of responsibility for this
tragedy . . . . We did not act quickly enough after the killing began . . . we did not
immediately call these crimes by their rightful name, genocide.’’7
A decade later, with the unfolding of ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ in the Darfur region of
Sudan, and conscious of the legacy of catastrophic moral failure in relation to Rwanda,
US Secretary of State Colin Powell declared before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee that, based on evidence of ‘‘a consistent and widespread pattern of
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atrocities,’’ he had concluded ‘‘that genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the
Government of Sudan and the Jingaweit [sic] bear responsibility—and that genocide
may still be occurring.’’8 By October 2005, moreover, the UN World Summit ‘‘Outcome
Document,’’9 representing the largest-ever gathering of heads of state and government,
had recognized the ‘‘responsibility to protect’’ populations, not only against genocide but
also against war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.10 Despite the
recognition of a collective responsibility on the part of the international community to
intervene against genocide, and the willingness of the US government, at least, to
characterize the situation as genocide, it is difficult to conclude that the international
community’s response to massive crimes in Darfur was significantly better than its
response to events in Rwanda. Likewise, had the less offensive term ‘‘atrocity crimes’’
been deployed in a preventive capacity, it is doubtful that more effective action would be
forthcoming. The impediment to an effective response was overwhelmingly a failure of
political will, as in Rwanda a decade earlier, and the particular terminology adopted
would have had a marginal impact at best. Use of the term ‘‘genocide’’ was hardly a
‘‘brake’’ on an effective response, because there was no effective response forthcoming
in any event. It is in this light that we should assess the misguided exercise by
the Security Council of establishing a commission of inquiry focused on whether or not
the slaughter fulfilled the legal definition of genocide. The obvious issue simply was the
prevention of genocide (or a similar crime of vast scale), not whether or not genocide had
occurred. In this context, the commission’s legal deliberations represented willful
blindness on the part of the Security Council to the imperative of prevention. Against
the backdrop of what was happening at the time, this legal hairsplitting was largely
a pretense of useful activity, and the debate over the application of particular
hierarchical abstractions a pretext for prolonging the ultimate decision not to take
robust action against Sudan, not to protect the civilian population against subjection
to obvious and outrageous horrors not in need of labeling. Had Secretary Powell
insisted that ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ were being committed in Darfur, or had he perhaps
claimed that ‘‘crimes against humanity’’ were being committed, there is little reason to
believe that the reaction would have been any different. Surely, the urgency of acting in
a preventive capacity against an enormous human catastrophe was not conceptually
difficult for Security Council members to appreciate.
Perhaps the most significant development during the post-Rwanda period, a
development with subtle but potentially far-reaching implications for transforming the
capacity of the UN to act more effectively, is the recent establishment of a mandate on
the prevention of genocide. On 12 July 2004, acting pursuant to art. 99 of the UN
Charter and Security Council resolution 1366 of 2001, the secretary-general informed
the Security Council of the appointment of Juan E. Méndez to serve as his special
adviser on the prevention of genocide.11 The outline of the mandate, attached to a
letter of the same date to the Security Council, provides in relevant part that the
special adviser will
(a) collect existing information, in particular from within the United Nations system, on
massive and serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law of
ethnic and racial origin that, if not prevented or halted, might lead to genocide; (b) act as
a mechanism of early warning to the Secretary-General, and through him to the Security
Council, by bringing to their attention potential situations that could result in genocide;
(c) make recommendations to the Security Council, through the Secretary-General, on
actions to prevent or halt genocide; (d) liaise with the United Nations system on
activities for the prevention of genocide and work to enhance the United Nations
capacity to analyse and manage information relating to genocide or related crimes.
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It is significant that this mandate is not much concerned with the definition of
genocide. The terms of reference specifically indicate that ‘‘The Special Adviser would
not make a determination on whether genocide within the meaning of the Convention
had occurred. The purpose of his activities, rather, would be practical and intended
to enable the United Nations to act in a timely fashion.’’12 A report on the work of
the Office of the Special Adviser on Prevention of Genocide13 that I submitted
on 7 November 2005, at the request of M. Mendez, reflects the views of a broad
cross-section of actors within the UN system, including UN officials, member states,
experts, and NGOs, on the prevention of genocide. These perspectives are particularly
instructive for the present discussion on the strategic value of ‘‘atrocity crimes’’
as a single term that could help focus attention on prevention, at least within the
UN system. The first observation is that the mandate relates to ‘‘genocide or related
crimes’’ and is deliberately not restricted to a particular legal definition. The second
is that ‘‘because the mandate of the Special Adviser is the prevention of genocide,
it cannot be limited to situations that actually constitute genocide under the definition
of that term in international law.’’14
With respect to the first point,
almost all respondents agreed that the Special Adviser’s mandate should include any
situation where identifiable groups were at risk of mass-killing or other forms of
destruction. It was pointed out that the Secretary-General’s speech before the 2004
session of the Human Rights Commission described the mandate as including ‘‘not only
genocide but also [. . .] mass murder and other large-scale human rights violations, such
as ethnic cleansing.’’ This understanding is confirmed by the 2005 World Summit
Outcome document which, in connection with the ‘‘responsibility to protect’’ populations
from ‘‘genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity,’’ endorsed
the mandate of the Special Adviser. Several respondents pointed out that it would be
inconceivable to exclude situations like the mass killing of political and social groups by
the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia from the scope of the mandate. It was observed that in
practice, it should be the quality and intention behind a potential attack against an
identifiable group that guides the mandate rather than strict legal definitions. It was
also remarked however, that an unduly broad interpretation of the type of situations
that are relevant would dilute the narrow focus of the mandate and consequently, its
added value within the United Nations system.15

Thus, there is a prevailing understanding within the UN system that the category of
situations this mandate is intended to prevent includes atrocities broader than
the crime of genocide, but that it should not be inordinately diluted either, since that
would risk trivialization of the mandate, ultimately compromising its effectiveness as
a focal point for action.
With respect to the second point, the report notes that
There is a conception of the Special Adviser’s mandate that confuses prevention of
genocide with intervention against genocide, and which thus looks to the Holocaust,
Rwanda, or the Darfur, as the archetypal genocidal situations warranting the Special
Adviser’s attention. Early warning and prevention should not be understood in such an
unduly narrow or stark sense. On some occasions, the Special Adviser’s informal
expressions of interest in a particular situation have been viewed with scepticism
within the United Nations Secretariat on the basis that a conflict was merely political
and did not contain an ethnic element, or that his assessment was alarmist and
unnecessary. There is a need to defer to the Special Adviser’s judgement in such
situations since the potential for genocide may not always be apparent from a conflict
prevention, human rights, or other perspectives.16
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This addresses the most important and most misunderstood aspect of this mandate,
and genocide prevention more generally—namely, that
the role of the Special Adviser should not be equated with an ‘‘alarm bell’’ warning
of imminent genocide or mass murder. Early warning requires interaction and
engagement within the United Nations system in order to improve the prospect of
warnings leading to appropriate action in a timely fashion. For instance, instead of a
public announcement of imminent atrocities, the Special Adviser could, at the early
stages of a situation with genocidal potential, discretely inform the Security Council
through the Secretary-General and propose the involvement of relevant actors such as
donor States, international financial institutions, or non-governmental organizations.
In other situations, the Special Adviser could make a discrete proposal to establish a
fact-finding mission or initiate a good offices procedure. Such behind-the-scenes
involvement, without any public reference to the mandate of preventing genocide, may
ease the prospect of constructive engagement with the relevant government, where
such an option exists. Early warning that leads to effective action must be seen as an
organic process rather than a disjointed last-minute whistle-blowing exercise.17

If there is an urgent objective, it is the mainstreaming of this conception of prevention
into an otherwise reactive culture within the UN system. Engagement of relevant
actors is less a function of emphasizing the ‘‘genocide’’ label than of the daily habits
and interactions within the decision-making process. As to the use of the term
‘‘genocide,’’ my report once again is instructive in terms of the views of actors within
the UN system:
A related issue, reinforcing the need for discrete networks of collaboration within the
United Nations system, is the apparent stigma attached to the Special Adviser’s
mandate. There is a widespread perception that his interest or involvement in a given
situation is an implicit indictment of a Government for the crime of genocide. . . . Such
views disregard the express stipulation in the Special Adviser’s mandate that he ‘‘not
make a determination on whether genocide within the meaning of the [1948 Genocide]
Convention ha[s] occurred.’’. . . Even supportive Member States view the title of the
mandate as a liability given the unique stigma attached to the term ‘‘genocide.’’
However, no convincing alternatives to the title have been proposed and some
respondents have pointed out that it is both a liability and an asset, since the term
‘‘genocide’’ also imbues the Special Adviser with moral authority. Such considerations
also point to an insufficient recognition of the discreet role that the Special Adviser can
play in such situations without necessarily alerting Governments or the public to his
direct involvement.18

Thus, in an early-warning context, the label of genocide is not so important, because
the most effective response may typically be discreet engagement of influential actors
rather than rallying public opinion. If circumstances are such that a more open and
confrontational posture is required, then the genocide label may actually be an
essential rhetorical weapon in galvanizing public opinion and calling for urgent
attention to a particular situation. Again, however, it is doubtful whether introducing
the new term ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ will make an appreciable difference rather than sowing
more confusion by introducing new terminology into a decision-making context where
it is a real struggle to integrate even established concepts in policy discourse.
Even if, in certain circumstances, there is a compelling need for a term that
captures the early stages of a potentially genocidal situation, the mandate of the
special adviser speaks to it in terms of ‘‘large-scale human rights violations,’’ which, in
effect, closely resembles the somewhat stricter concept of crimes against humanity.
This is an important distinction from the concept of war crimes, which applies only to
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situations of armed conflict. War crimes, such as murder, torture, and rape, may be
isolated or random acts; they are virtually identical with serious human-rights
violations, except that in a state of armed conflict killing and injuring combatants is
permissible. Thus, the right to life, liberty, and security of the person, as a peacetime
human-rights standard, is more exacting than the lex specialis of international
humanitarian law, which permits exceptions. Killings in peacetime would appear to be
even more ominous than similar acts during an armed conflict, given the absolute
protection of the right to life in such circumstances. In this respect, it is noteworthy
that the contemporary definition of ‘‘crimes against humanity’’ in international law
does not require a nexus with armed conflict, such that this broad category applies in
peacetime as well. Although ‘‘large-scale human rights violations’’ can be substantially
assimilated to this category in the broad context of humanitarian or policy discourse,
crimes against humanity incorporate a legal requirement of a widespread or
systematic attack against a civilian population, which may also become a pretext for
futile or obstructive legal debate rather than effective preventive action.19 Perhaps
this is why the secretary-general’s definition of the mandate is deliberately broad and
flexible in including the term ‘‘large-scale human rights violations.’’ Thus, even if it
were assumed that ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ is a useful label for prompting preventive action
when a situation leading to potential genocide is still dormant, the concept should
comprise not only war crimes but also large-scale violations of human rights.
If anything, the worst genocides could occur in situations where one side is not in
a position to offer military resistance, where there is no armed conflict but simply
one-sided massacres, or where, at least, human-rights violations that are significant
and ominous in a particular context, but not legally qualified as widespread
or systematic, could quickly explode into large-scale violence. In Rwanda, large-scale
though still limited human-rights violations—isolated massacres, for instance—and
not war crimes preceded the onset of the genocide of April 1994; in Darfur,
a low-intensity armed conflict with relatively few war crimes rapidly escalated to
‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ and genocide. So restricting ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ by not including
violations of human rights is a potentially serious oversight. In any event, why
reinvent the wheel when existing concepts are more than adequate? Even assuming
that a less intimidating concept than ‘‘prevention of genocide’’ is required, there is
no compelling reason not to use the well-established and easily recognized term ‘‘largescale human rights violations,’’ as indicated in the UN mandate, or, alternatively, the
similar term ‘‘gross’’ human rights violations, which was stipulated in UN Economic
and Social Council Resolution 1503 (XLVIII) (1970) as the standard for situations
requiring consideration by the UN Human Rights Commission. Why spend considerable time and effort to familiarize the UN system with a new concept, or to lobby for
adoption of the standard in a resolution or internal guideline, when there is already a
pressing need to internalize existing concepts? This is particularly so because the
existing concepts are more than adequate for all the purposes that the proposed
category of ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ is intended to serve.
It is also doubtful that the new term ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ would somehow focus
the attention of the wider public. ‘‘Prevention of genocide’’ more clearly explains, in
non-specialist terms, the reality of taking action in order to prevent something
approximating mass killings or collective destruction. The term ‘‘prevention of atrocity
crimes’’ would be inaccurate and misleading, since the only relevance in this context is
that such crimes are a precursor to genocide or similar crimes. What we are really
trying to say is that we should deal with ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ because they may lead to
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a much more serious crime, such as genocide. The phrase ‘‘prevention of genocide’’
more readily captures this concept among the uninitiated public. If any education
is required, it is in the concept of ‘‘prevention’’ rather than that of ‘‘atrocity crimes.’’
Ultimately, such atrocities are worthy of heightened attention because of the
potential for genocide, and not all ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ necessarily imply escalation into
mass killings or other forms of collective destruction that justify privileged treatment
of such contexts.
We should also consider whether placing our faith in abstractions as a means
of stimulating the will to act, especially among the wider public, overlooks the vital role
of emotional connection with the stark horror of such situations, where rational
normative schemes are certainly not at the forefront of people’s minds. When we look
at bodies littering the hills of Rwanda or the Darfur, is it the schematic labeling that
arouses indignation and empathy, or the intimate face of suffering? Is our inordinate
faith in intellectual concepts and terms not a privileging of distance over intimacy,
a case of inadvertently placing abstractions over engagement? Is the more powerful
form of cognition, in this context, not emotional rather than rational? Is it not the
unspeakability of such evil, the ineffability of intense human suffering, that speaks
most loudly to our conscience? The voices of survivors, the cruel reality of hatred
and violence, are more potent than any term that we could devise in our rarefied midst
as scholars and advocates.
When the UNCG was adopted on 9 December 1948, the president of the
UN General Assembly triumphantly declared that ‘‘the supremacy of international
law had been proclaimed and a significant advance had been made in the development
of international criminal law.’’20 The less euphoric prognosis of Sir Hartley
Shawcross—the eminent British prosecutor at Nuremberg—was that, ‘‘while making
no significant contribution to international law, the convention might . . . delude people
into thinking that some great step forward had been taken whereas in reality nothing
at all had been changed.’’21 In retrospect, the culture of impunity that has prevailed
for much of the UN era, and the continuing failure to intervene against genocide in
places such as Rwanda and Darfur, gives some credence to Sir Hartley’s skepticism
about inordinate emphasis on legal definitions and proliferation of terminology.
In considering whether ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ would make a substantial contribution
to contemporary challenges, we should consider his admonition about creating
the illusion of progress, and ponder whether our efforts would not be better placed
in consolidating existing norms and concepts, painstakingly won and still at the
margins of power.
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